Machine learning (ML) is gaining popularity in the network security domain as more network-enabled devices get connected, as malicious activities become stealthier, and as new technologies like Software Defined Networking (SDN) emerge. From the application layer, ML-based SDN security models control the routing/switching of an entire Software Defined Network. Compromising the models is hackers' desirable goal. Previous works have been done on either adversarial machine learning without the context of secure networking environment or on the general vulnerabilities of SDNs without much consideration of the defending ML models. Through examination of the latest ML-based SDN security applications, a good look at ML/SDN specific vulnerabilities accompanied by a successful attack on StratosphereIPS, this paper makes a case for more secure developments of ML-based SDN security applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning is being used to reduce the gaps between connected devices and the number of network security professionals. Per U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [1] , a projected growth in cyber security jobs from 2014 to 2024 is 18% while Cisco [2] predicted a 100% increase in network-enabled devices, growing from 4 billions in 2016 to 8 billions units in 2021. Global data traffics will increase by at least 5 times. The emergence of Software Defined Network (SDN) makes machine learning (ML) based network security solutions even more appealing. Usually, researchers design new ML-based security solutions and then use benchmark results to prove the models' accuracy. Such methodology alone is not attractive enough in the eyes of cybersecurity leaders due to the lack of information on how those solutions will fit into the bigger picture at their organizations. Other than accuracy, the cybersecurity leaders would also like to know about the model's projected maintenance costs, the model's ability to withstand abuses, the quality of source codes, the ways datasets were collected, and so on.
There has been discussions on adversarial machine learning or the general vulnerabilities of SDNs but not in the context of how vulnerable are the ML models when being used to protect SDNs. This paper will fill the gap by addressing:
1) The latest landscape of ML enabled SDN security solutions 2) The vulnerabilities of common ML models being used in SDN security solutions 3) The general ways the ML models can be attacked from a SDN/ML kill-chain perspective 4) A sample hack of a ML-based network security solution 5) What can be done to better develop ML-based SDN security solutions.
The paper recognizes that ML models deployed in a network detection/prevention system are not perfect. Hence, there is always a possibility for adversaries to manipulate and/or bypass the models. Once compromised, the models can be cloned and used for off-line attacks in preparation for future mallicious campaigns.
II. SDN BASED NETWORK SECURITY SOLUTIONS

A. Background on SDNs
Motivated by the inflexibility of traditional networks, SDN sets itself apart based on the principle of separating network policies completely from network implementations [3] . It consists of 4 pillars : 1. Separating control plane (CP) from data plane (DP) 2. Using flow-based forwarding (instead of destination-based) 3. Controling all the flow logics by network "operating system" (NOS) 4. Supporting programmable APIs. Changes can now happen at a faster speed with higher accuracy.
In fact, well-designed APIs between the planes are one indicator of a good SDN as they are separated into Southbound group (facing the data plane) and Northbound group (facing the application plane). OpenFlow is one example of such API. During normal operations, CP will dynamically modify the flow 
B. SDN based network security solutions
Due to its flexibility and the nature of centralized control, many creative network security solutions have been made for SDNs.
1) Policy Enforcement: Products like SANE [4] allow enforcement of simple and natural access control policies at the link layer (independent from topologies) while hiding topology and service information from those without the needs to know. More than just access control, SDN also supports a wide range of security policies for intrusion-detection, virus scanning, protocol identification, etc. LiveSec [5] is one example with its "interactive policy enforcement", in which network administrators can add or remove both rules and network security services easily with visual feedbacks. The benefits of SDN become more obvious in cloud environments. We can apply different sets of policies onto different types of instances being created dynamically on the cloud, providing protection services similar to firewalls as well as elastic IP service [6] . Because the controller has a detailed overview of flows and flow paths in its network, enforcing address validation policies is also very efficient [7] .
2) Denial of Service Mitigation: The key point in protecting networks from being DOS'ed is the quick recognition of what flows of traffics are malicious. Because malicious packets are very similar to legitimate packets, the use of ML algorithms for automatic flow classification is common. Traditional methods involve pre-processing of traffic log files and captured packets. Such high overhead practice is not needed in SDN since counters are embedded within each network device on the data plane, and those statistics can be queried by the control plane at anytime.
A SDN DOS detection loop contains 3 components: the Flow Collector, the Feature Extractor, and the Classifier [8] .
Once identified, malicious traffics should be dropped or forwarded to a null interface as being used in Remote Triggered Blackhole Routing Component (RTBH). The collateral damage is high with legacy RTBH due to the inflexibility of the trigger routers. SDN can allow a much more flexible RTBH, dropping the malicious flows while still maintaining benign flows [9] .
3) Cloud Security: In current PaaS offerings, everything follows the service model of provisioning, binding, and unbinding cycles. Implementing cloud network security functions is therefore difficult. For one reason, the "wiring" between services can get really complicated and time consuming. For another reason, it is difficult to reach to the network packetlevel from the cloud application level since all packet fields are hidden. SDN allows cloud network security services to manipulate traffics with minimal data copying, operate at both packet and request levels, conveniently generate callbacks via existing APIs, and be easily chained with other network services [10] . High level routing algorithms can be designed and implemented in a way that guarantees all packets will be inspected by at least one security device [11] . 4) Topology Protection: Protecting network topology is crucial in SDNs since all popular SDN controller are all subjected to network topology attacks [12] . Any changes to flow behaviors should be flagged for immediate remedy. Solutions can be flow-graph based [13] in which flow-graph of flows will be incrementally built and verified in real time. Verification is either deterministic (following the edges of graph) or probabilistic. Other solutions include VeriFlow [14] , AvantGuard [15] , and FloodGuard [16] . More security solutions for SDNs can be found in published surveys [17] , [18] .
C. Anomaly Detection Using Machine Learning
From Figure 1 , we see that the latest research landscape of ML-based security solutions for SDN is very evolving. Compared with signature based detection, anomaly detection using ML is more scalable, and more flexible [18] . All machine learning approaches follow the same general steps of identifying/building learning data sets, feature extraction and classification. Selecting the right dataset is crucial because ML models can only identify anomalies based on what it has known (trained with). The more organic, diverse and properly prepared datasets we have, the more accurate our models will be. Pre-processing steps usually involves mapping symbolic values to numeric values, data scaling, etc. In the feature extraction step, we pick the optimal number of features that will be used by the model in order to successfully categorize the classes we want. Common methods are dimensional reduction (mapping more dimension variables into fewer ones), clustering (identifying groups of items with similar characteristics), statistical sampling, measuring and picking samples based on entropy, etc.
For classification, there are three approaches: 1. Supervised learning (the models learn from labeled data and predict unknown cases) 2. Unsupervised learning (the models learn the fundamentals of unlabeled data and predict unknown cases) 3. Semi-supervised learning (a mixed method dealing with both labeled and unlabeled data). Further details behind ML algorithms and methodologies can be found in numerous ML general surveys [18] , [28] , [29] .
In the domain of network security, SDN brings some unique advantages to the deployments of ML based network security solutions. For example, the centralized control sitting on the software layer with API access making it very convenient to develop ML softwares. Devices in SDN data plane has counters built-in and can provide statistical reports to application layer softwares upon requests. Table I provides us with the most notable SDN/ML research works indexed by IEEE Xplore from 2017 to MAR2018 (the time of this paper) from which we can see a broad range of ML based solutions and the incredible flexibility that SDN architecture can provide.
III. ISSUES WITH ML MODELS USED IN SDN SECURITY
SOLUTIONS
In addition to existing problems within SDN protocols such as OpenFlow vulnerabilities [30] , ML-based security solutions for SDN also face issues with (i) hard to find organic training data; (ii) a semantic gap between initial work and practical real world deployments; (iii) enormous variability in input data; (iv) measuring and minimizing the cost of errors; and (v) other difficulties in evaluation [31] .
A large portion of training data for ML-based SDN security applications is synthetic and is not realistic enough. Commonly used data sets include but are not limited to the University of New Brunswick ISCX 2012 Intrusion Detection, Evaluation Data Set, the CIC DOS Dataset, the KDD dataset, the ADFA-LD12 dataset, the UNSW-NB15 dataset, the WSN-DS dataset, and so on [18] . Because those datasets were developed by research institutes and made available to the public, ML-based solutions trained on those datasets alone can be outmaneuvered by adversaries who studied the same data. While some corporations have the capability to collect own training datasets from their existing networks, the fear of business secrets, confidential communications, and employees personal identifiable information being leaked from such datasets really discourages them.
Unlike Artificial Intelligence, a ML model works by recognizing the deviations from what it was trained on and because of problems with training datasets, ML models usually give plenty of false positives when being deployed in realworld environment. It is also difficult to interpret the overall results for actionable intelligence -a.k.a the Semantic Gap. For example, if the model's accuracy is 98% on detecting some variations of social security numbers in http traffics, it does not give the administrators much information on how social security numbers are actually being leaked out of the network. The model simply does not know what it does not know (trained with).
Even when there is absolutely nothing wrong going on, the performance of ML models in the real world is usually degraded because of significantly higher volumes of data, a much wider range of fluctuations, real world constraints, etc. While being good at classifying data, ML models are not be able to recognize the context and logics behind real world scenarios [18] . Consequently, it is challenging to really evaluate a model. While there is no agreed standard and what metrics should be used on evaluating ML models, justification cannot be relied on the accuracy rate alone.
In the following section, we will further examine the inherent limitations of common ML algorithms being used in SDN security applications.
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) are fit for non-linear problems but tend to suffer from local minima leading to long learning time, and as the number of features increases, the longer it will take to learn.
Bayesian network is a probabilistic directed acyclic graph type with nodes as variables and the edges as their relationships. Based on the relationships, a node can "walk" to another. At the end of the walk, a final probabilistic score is formed. Relationship links that have high true positive score will be verified and formed into rules. Therefore, a Bayesian network is proactive even in misuse mode [32] .
Clustering models (k-means, k-nearest neighbor, etc.) do not require explicit descriptions of classes. However too many features may confuse the model and any imbalance in the feature set will negatively affect its decisions (the "curse of dimensionality").
Decision tree is a flow-chart like structure built on concepts of information gain/entropy where each node choose the best fit attribute to split current set of examples into subsets. Normally, decision trees provide high accuracy with simple implementation. It is not usually the case with larger trees where the model tends to favor attributes with more levels.
Genetic Algorithm (GA) and Genetic Programming (GP) are most used Evolutionary Computation (EC) methods. Experiments with various attack types show that the average false alarm rate is very low. However, the sensitivity in detecting new attacks varies greatly (from 66% to 100%) depending on attack types [32] .
Naive Bayes model calculates the final conditional probability of "attack" (or "normal") with a naive assumption that the used features are independent from each other. That assumption is the biggest limitation of this model.
Supported Vector Machine (SVM) is a binary classification model by design. With a kernel such as linear, polynomial, Gaussian Radial Basis Function, etc; the model will try to draw a hyperplane that divides the feature space into two classes. Sometimes, when overlapping is unavoidable, slack variables will be added and each overlapping data point will be be assigned a cost value. In such case, slack variables can be abused leading to models' vulnerabilities.
IV. THEORETICAL METHODS OF ATTACKING ML MODELS
The definition of "attack" on ML models should be flexible and be focusing on the models' purposes rather than the models' functionalities. The accuracy rate is not the only thing adversaries can target. For example, adversaries can cause the models to produce true positives that are very close to false positives. Consequently, it causes burn-outs on the security analysts who are going to manually inspect the flagged events. "Attack" can also mean significantly increasing the time it takes for a ML model to make a specific decision or to learn new knowledge. Figure 2 proposes a systematic way to look at threats targeting ML models within SDNs. The pivotal point is at the end of phase 4 where the defending ML-model was extracted for off-line attacks. In model extraction, inputs are given to a trained model,the outputs then got harvested, and the adversarial model learns from those input-output pairs. While it appears that training the original model and cloning an existing model are quite similar, model cloning does not have to deal with broken or faulty data entries that can delay or even mislead the learning process. Instead of 100% accuracy, attackers may only need to clone a model with 90% accuracy for their purposes, hence the amount of probes needed may be lower than expected. Model cloning also does not have to deal with optimization issues such as local minima/maxima traps. In 2016, Tramer et. al. [33] proposed several methods to perform model extraction of several ML types.
A. Equation-solving attack
This form of attack is fit for logistic regression types such as binary logistic regression (BLR), multi-class logistic regression (MLR), and multi-layer perceptron (MLP). Because the models can be represented as equations with variables, attackers just need to feed the known variable values in, and use mathematics to solve the equations for the rest of the unknown values. For example, with BLR, we have :
Attacker will feed x i to the trained model and the model will give y i = f (x i ) = σ(w×x i +β). If we have enough x i , y i , we should be able to solve the equations for w and β. With MLR, the function can be solved by minimizing its cost/ lost functions.
In Tramer's experiments, it required an average of 41 probes to clone a BLR model, and 54,100 probes to clone a MLP model with 20 hidden nodes. Within a secure SDN environment with firewalls and sensors, adversaries can still use passive scanning techniques [34] , [35] to scan the models. Active scans in phase 1 can be weaponized by an adaptive engine designed in phase 2 (figure 2). Based on first few inputoutput pairs, a black-box approximation method [36] forms the basis of such adaptive engine, which in turn, optimizes scan efforts around possible sensitive areas of the main models, and maximize the scan impacts.
B. Model inversion attack
Given feature dimension d with feature vector x 1 , x 2 , ..., x d , some knowledge about some of the features, and access to f -the model, Fredrikson et al. [37] proposed that a black box model inversion attack which involves finding an optimal x that maximizes the probability of some known values.
For instance, if an image of Bob was used to train model M to recognize category "man". If that exact image is fed into M, the result will be "man" with 100% confidence while images do not belong to the training set will never get such absolute score from the model. Tramer et al. [33] upgraded this approach by performing inversion attack on a cloned model M' of M. The reported improvement is a 6-hour faster recovering time for 40 faces.
This kind of attack opens a theoretical possibility of which attackers can gain some insightful knowledge about a security model's trained data set if they could clone the model with near-perfect accuracy and somehow was able to tunnel it out. This also serves as the basis for phase 4 and 5 -Exploitation and Installation as shown in figure 2 . Insights about how the models were trained reveal permanent blind-spots and bias which came from the trainers (in supervised training) or from the model itself (in unsupervised training). Adversaries can then build strategies to widen such blind-spots or even "install" new ones.
C. Path-finding attack
Tramer et al. [33] also extended prior works on tree attacks and proposed "path-finding" attack which can be used to map binary trees, multi-nary trees, and regression trees. We have a tree T with v nodes and at each node, there is an identifier id v . With x ∈ X, an oracle query will give O(x) = id v . If x ∈ X 1 ∪ ⊥ × ... × X d ∪ ⊥, O(x) will return the identifier at the node where T stops. To begin the attack, we pick x ∈
gives id Lv at the leaves of the tree. We then can separate [a, b] into n sub ranges where n is the number of the corresponding known leaves (at this point). For each X i1 sub range, we repeat the process and find another nodes/leaves. This was referred to as the top-down approach which is of higher performance than the bottom-up approach. Reported performance evaluations of this approach show that in order to achieve 100% on 1 − R test and 1 − R unif , it will take 29,609 queries to clone a tree with 318 leaves, 8 layers of depth; 1,788 queries to clone a tree with 49 leaves, 11 layers of depth; and 7,390 queries to clone a tree with 155 leaves and 9 layers of depth.
D. Other attacks
There are several more ways to attack ML models. The Lowd-Meek attack [38] targets linear classifiers that give only class labels as models' outputs. The general idea of this approach is using adaptive queries to throw sample points at the suspected positions of the hyperplane. Another way to attack was described by Bruckner [39] as a single Stackelberg Prediction Game (SPG). In this game, the Leader (L) is the one with the original ML model M. the Follower (F) is the attacker. F will attack L by generating and feeding model M data that at least will prevent M from learning new knowledge or at most, teach M new faulty knowledge. Theoretically, this can be achieved by providing learning data that maximize the cost function of model M. In real life situations, there are more than one attacker with different attacking goals and L does not know how many F are there and what exactly each F is trying to do. This escalates to the Bayesian Stackelberg Game. Zhou and Kantarcioglu described it as "Nested Stackelberg Game" [40] suggesting a solution of using and switching a set of models to confuse the attacker. Kantarcioglu later on also proposed the concept of "planning many steps ahead" in this game.
V. A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE OF ATTACKING ML MODELS
This example simulates off-line attacks happening at the end of phase 4 where the targeted model was successfully cloned. It follows a white-box approach and targets StratosphereIPS [41] -a Bayesian-based network intrusion prevention system. The inner workings of StratosphereIPS are demonstrated in figure 2 by green components. Default installation of Strato-sphereIPS with more than 10 default models was used, and the models' confidence scores, a common feature in most ML products, were abused. Stratosphere source codes and default models' integrity were left intact. The main goal of this experiment is making as few changes as possible to the malicious behavior patterns while evading detection (getting detection score as close to zero as possible). The implementation involves two main functions: Explore and Blending. if max(s1 − score, s2 − score) > dif f then 12: dif f ←max(s1-score,score-s2) 13: hotspot ←i 14: return timef rame(hotspot) Return start/end time A malicious payload m (Zeus DNS traffics) was passed into the Explore function. Based on set parameters, Explore will chop m into n small blocks, and will try to detect which single block has the most influence on the confidence score of m as a whole. Such block is called "hot spot" which has the highest "diff" score. The diff score is calculated by comparing individual block scans (s1, s2) with initial m scan (score). "s1" is the detection score of a particular small block x. "s2" is the detection score of block m without that small block x.
If a block x indeed plays a significant role in the final detection score of m, it should have the highest s1 score and/or the lowest s2 among the n blocks. The output of Explore is the location of block x within the malicious payload m. export ←timeSync(export) 10: return export
The hot spot location is then reported to the Blending function which will blend normal traffics into the spot, diluting it. The blending algorithm used in this demonstration is a simple interlacing algorithm which can be replaced by other algorithms. Normal traffics can be non-malicious packets or zero-transmission. This will virtually affect the size, periodicity, and timing of the flows; adding noises to the Bayesianbased behavioral signature of the payload. The Explore and Blending functions can be nested and looped until a certain low detection score is met.
It is notable that if the number of chopped blocks (n) is too high, many loops may be needed and the process may get inefficient. The size of normal (or empty data) blocks should be carefully chosen as well. For example, if we want to explore a 15-minute window of malicious traffics and we chop it into 3 blocks, the normal data block to be blended into one of the three malicious blocks (the "hot spot") should not last longer than 5 minutes.
Official Stratosphere [42] Zeus malicious dataset and normal dataset 1 were used. First, Stratosphere was manually installed. Official malicious payloads for a duration of 15 minutes were extracted and ran against StratosphereIPS to confirm positive detection of malware (Zeus). Then, Explore and Blend functions were applied. The end result is a total evasion of StratosphereIPS default models 2 .
The implications of this successful hack do not have anything to do with proving the weakness of StratosphereIPS but rather, stressing the importance of threat modeling in SDM/ML security solution designs. Not to be confused with ML models, threat models are the basic components of a Risk Management framework, focusing on the main questions of "What may go wrong?"
For example, one biggest assumption of StratosphereIPS is that malicious bot makers do not change the behaviors of their bots frequently [41] . Therefore, StratosphereIPS employs the modularity approach of using small ML models, each of which takes care of a narrow group of malwares/bots. If the bots evolve beyond a detection model's range, a new model has to be built using a provided ML model builder framework. The successful hack shows that it does not require dramatic changes in a bot's code-base in order to evade existing detection models. In this particular case (Zeus), the bot only needs to stop transmitting malicious DNS traffics at the right time. That, in turn, raises another question about how much will it cost the defense team to come up with new models in response to quick, simple changes in bot behaviors.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
ML for SND security is more than just plugging in ML models via the SDN's API interfaces, and optimizing for the highest accuracy levels. The paper recommends SND/ML network security designers to also integrate threat modeling into their works.
A. Invest time on attack/defense threat modeling
From the beginning, ML scientists should pay attention to the ML cyber kill-chain (threat modeling) and at least develop a list of recommendations on safe implementation. Recommendations may include but are not limited to the designer's definition of "attack", cautions on potential pitfalls due to certain problems with collecting initial training data, the meanings of ML model's accuracy, the side channels, etc.
Some ML based solutions were designed to be multi-purposes. Some solutions were originally designed for a specific purpose but are being used for other purposes in real-world implementations. The designers should clearly communicate the intended use of the works they are proposing and ways to protect the models in different use cases. The paper included figure 2 as one example of a threat model.
As mentioned before, the definition of "attack" should depend on the model's intended main purposes rather than just its accuracy. Most recent works in ML based security for SDNs have accuracy rates of 98% (Table I) but the meaning of even a 0.5% increase in false negatives may differ greatly from implementation to another. Based on the attack model, the ML designers may also provide a default protection model, explaining how the structure of their designs fit into the protection model, what can be done to harden their works, what are the security trade-offs to be considered, and so on.
B. Design audit-able ML model
ML based solutions should generate meaningful logs or even better, having an interface for the model to be audited automatically. Audits may include information on who made what changes, how much the model has drifted after a period of time, the rates of suspected false positives (un-flagged manually by analysts) and false negatives (flagged by analysts or other tools), etc. Ideally, the model itself should be able to give indications on whether or not it is under possible attacks and clues on which stage of the kill chain the attackers are at. For example, an ML model can look back to its performance in recent past regarding the same network pattern. If, for example, the confidence score is now significantly lower than the last 14-day's score, then there has probably been a poison attack. ML based solution with good audit capability will also help in case the model needs to be rolled back to its earlier versions.
C. Follow secure development processes
Because ML based security solutions are softwares, the designers should at least follow a secure software development life-cycle [43] . It involves secure coding practices, static analysis, test cases, attack surface reviews, and so on. Formal verification is absolutely necessary and should be done to the largest extend possible considering there are huge challenges in performing formal verifications on systems like the artificial neural networks. Side channels should be limited and there are mechanisms to protect the privacy of the model and its data. Last but not least, datasets used for training should be as organic as possible.
D. Design an operational cost modeling
Cost is another factor as important as accuracy. For the same purpose, a leaner ML algorithm will usually cost less than a complicated one but there may be cases where it is justifiable to have a complex ML model or even a group of different ML models working together. The designers should at least provide a cost model to make practical sense out of their design decisions. A well designed cost model will help with evaluating the cost of false negatives -a very important metric in ML based solutions for cyber security. Previous works like [44] may serve as a good start for further readings into optimizing ML-model's operational costs.
VII. CONCLUSION
SDN environments with additional side channels, much higher levels of elasticity, and lower risk tolerance when being deployed in the cloud only set the bar higher for the robustness of SDN/ML-based security solutions. The paper provided a cyber kill-chain targeting SDN/ML security models with theoretical methods backing up the first 4 phases. A practical hack of a well-known ML-based network IPS serves as a demonstration of what could come next after phase 4. It is of no doubt that adversaries can find or even create "hidden channels" within our SDN networks if we are not careful.
The paper made four specific recommendations: 1) Pay attention to threat models while designing ML solutions. 2) Make the ML model audit-able 3) Follow a secure development process 4)Produce an initial operational cost model. It is believed that these recommendations will significantly improve the practical properties of SDN/ML-based security solutions.
The landscape of ML based solutions for SDN security (Figure 1 ) is heating up. While research works do not have to be commercial ready, it is important that solution designers establish initial foundations for the hardening of their works, instead of focusing on the accuracy rate alone. There are many surfaces for adversaries to attack a ML model. Let's not forget that attackers are also equipped with Machine Learning powers.
Future works will include an automatic system designed to evaluate the robustness of well-known ML-based, open-source cybersecurity products such as Apache Spot [45] . Hopefully, it can be developed into a threat model assessment tool which can be used to communicate better evaluation metrics of MLbased security solutions for SDN.
